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promise, an action for breach of contract would have lain at Athens. But if my cow had broken my neighbour's fence, my obligation to repair the damage would have given rise not to an action for breach of contract, but to a 5tK?7 j8Aa£??s. (Meier, Att. Proc. pp. 476, 477.) On the other hand, a s'lkt) fixdgys would lie against a person who had committed a breach of contract ; for he was regarded as a wrongdoer, and liable to pay compensation to the party injured. Therefore Dionyso-dorus, who had failed to perform the conditions of a vavriK.%1 <ru77pa</>7?, had a si'kt? P\d§ris brought against him by the persons who lent him money on his ship. (Demosth. 1282 ; see also pro Pkorm. 950, c. Callipp. 1240.) The Athenian law frequently gave an option between various forms of action. It is not, however, improbable that the St/CT? crvvQriK&v irapa€dcr€a)s was only one species of the 5i'/o] /3Aa&7js, and the name one of a less technical kind. Wherever a debt had become due to a man by reason of some previous contract, we ma}* suppose that he had the option between an action of debt (xpeous) and one for breach of contract. The same observation will apply to the Si/ecu Trapa/cara&Tjfojs, apyvpiov, and others of a similar kind. The main point of difference might be this : that in a general action for breach of contract, the plaintiff went for unliquidated damages, which the court had to assess ; whereas, upon a claim to recover a debt or sum certain, or a specific chattel, the court had nothing more to do than to determine whether the plaintiff was entitled to it or not ; the ay&v was ari^Tos. All such actions were tried before the ©ecr/xofleTcu. (Meier, Att. Proc. pp. 67, 184, 493—497, 510.)
'O/AoXoyia appears to be a word of less technical nature than crwO^KTj^ though (as we might expect in words of this sort) the}*" are often used indifferently. Grammarians make them synonymous. (Harpocr. s. v. 'AffvvQeTt&TaTov : Suidas, s. v. 'Svv-flryKTj.) ^vvGyKas iroieicrOai or rideffdai (.isrd twos is, to make an agreement with any one ; eVi/xeVeiz/ tois crwQ-fjKais, to abide by it ; virepgaivetv or irapa^cuj/eij/, to break or transgress. Here we may observe, that <rvvQr\K.a.i is constantly used in the plural, instead of trui/flr/K^, the only difference being, that strictly the former signifies the terms or articles of agreement, in the same manner as i, the testamentary dispositions, is put for , the will. ^v^SoXov also signifies a compact or agreement, but had become (in Attic parlance) obsolete in this sense, except in the expression Siicai ctTrb (rvjjL§6\wv. (See below.) [C.R.K.]
SYMBOLON, DIKAE APO (Stow airb <rv^ €6Xwi/). The ancient Greek states had no well defined international law for the .protection of their respective members. In the earlier times troops of robbers used to roam about from one country to another, and commit aggressions upon individuals, who in their turn made reprisals, and took the law into their own hands. Even when the state took upon itself to resent the injury done to its members, a violent remedy was resorted to, such as the giving authority to take crOAa, or pvffia, a sort of national distress. As the Greeks advanced in civilization, and a' closer intercourse sprang up among them, disputes between the natives of different countries were settled (whenever it was possible) by friendly negotiation. It soon began to be evident, that it would be much better, if, instead of any interference on the part of the state.
such disputes could be decided by legal process, either in the one country or the other. Among every people, however, the laws were so framed, as to render the administration of justice more favourable to a citizen than to a foreigner ; and therefore it would be disadvantageous, and often dangerous, to sue a man, or be sued by him, in his own country. The most friendly relation might subsist between two states, such as cri^juaxt'a or eTrrya^uta, and yet the natives of each be exposed to this disadvantage in their mutual intercourse. To obviate such an evil, it was necessary to have a special agreement, declaring the conditions upon which justice was to be reciprocally administered. International contracts of this kind were called <ruyU,goAa, defined by Suidas thus, <rvvQr\K.a.i &s Uv aAArjAcus at ir6Xets &e,uej/cu rdrruffi raits TroXircus, &ffT€ e>t8oi/ai Kal Xafj.8a.veiv ra 8i/ccua: and the causes tried in pursuance of such contracts were called S//c«i anl) <rv}jL€6\(av. The more constant and more important the intercourse between any two nations, the more necessary would it be for them to establish a good system of international jurisprudence. Commercial people would stand in need of it the most. Aristotle mentions the Tuscans and Carthaginians as having crifycgoAa irepi rov [j,fy aoiKs'iv. (Polit. iii. 1, 3, and 5, 10.) No such agreement has been preserved to us, and we know but little about the terms that were usually prescribed. The basis of them seems to have been the principle that actor sequitur forum rei; but this, as well as other conditions, must have varied according to circumstances. Liberty of person, and protection of property, would, no doubt, be secured to the foreigner, as far as possible ; and it would be the duty of the irp6^6vos to see that these rights were respected. A common provision was, that the party who lost his cause might appeal to the tribunal of the other country, or to that of some third state mutually agreed upon. (Etym. Magn. s. v. "ekkatjtos TroXis.) This was perhaps suggested by the practice which had grown up, of re« ferring national quarrels to the arbitration of some individual or third state. (Thucyd. i. 34, 78, 140, v. 41, vii. 18 ; Schomann, Ant. Jur. pub. Gr. p. 367.)
When the Athenians made any such treaty, they required it to be approved of and finally ratified by a jury of the Heliaea, under the direction of the Thesmothetae. Hence Pollux (viii. 88) says of those magistrates, t& o^ju^oAa ret, Trpbs ras TrdAeis Kvpovviv. The other contracting state was therefore compelled to send an envoy to Athens, with power to conclude the treaty (if he thought fit) as it was drawn up and settled by the Thesmothetae and jurors. Most of the people with whom the Athenians had to deal, were either subject or inferior to them, and were content to acquiesce in the above regulation. Philip, however, would not submit to it, and demanded that the terms should receive final ratification in Macedonia, This demand is made the subject of complaint by Demosthenes (de Halon. 78).
The name of 8i/ccu curb avfj*§6\<jw was given also to the causes which the allies of the Athenians sent to be tried at Athens. (Pollux, viii. 63.) This fact has been called in question by Bb'ckh, but there is not much reason for doubting it. It is true that the expression is not strictly applicable to causes, not between an Athenian and a foreigner, but between two foreigners ; and it may be allowed