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called Auctor with respect to his successor. In order to be Singular succession, the whole right of the auctor must be transferred. He to whom an estate in fee simple is transferred, takes by Singular succession : he to whom a life estate is granted out of an estate in fee simple, does not take by Singular succession.
The object of Universal succession is property as an ideal whole (universitas} without any reference to its component parts. Yet the notion of succession applies as well to a fraction of this ideal whole as to the unit which this ideal whole is conceived to be ; for the whole property being viewed as a unit, it may be conceived to be divided into fractional parts without any reference to the several things which are included in the ideal whole. It was also consistent with this species of succession that many particular things should be incapable of being transferred : thus in the case of an hereditas
The object of Universal succession is a Univer-sitas as such, and it is by means of the words Universitas and Universum, that the Romans denote this kind of succession ; but it would be erroneous to infer from this use of the term that succession applies to all Universitates. Its proper application is to property, and the true character of Universal succession is the immediate passing over from one person to another of all the credits and debts that belong or are attached to the property. This happens in the case of an hereditas : heres in omne jus mortui, non tantum singularum rerum dominium succedit, quum et ea quae in nominibus sunt ad heredem transeant (Dig. 29. tit. 2. s. 37) ; and in the case of adrogation as to most matters. The debts would be transferred by adrogation if this were not accompanied with a capitis deminutio. Credits and debts could not be transferred by Singular succession. The cases of Universal succession were limited and the notion could not be applied and made effectual at the pleasure of individuals. The most important cases of Universal succession were the property of a deceased person ; as hereditas, bonorum possessio, fideicommissaria hereditas, and others of the like kind. The property of a living person might be transferred in this way, in the case of adrogatio, conventio in inanuin, and the bonorum emtio. (Gains, ii. 98.) In many other cases though the object is to transfer a whole property, it is in fact effected by the transfer of the several things' the following are instances of this kind of transfer, the gift of a whole property, or its being made a Dos, or being brought into a Societas, or the sale of an hereditas by a heres.
The notion of a Universal succession among the Romans appears to have been derived from the notion of the hereditas, to which it was necessary to attach the credits and debts of the deceased and the sacra. Other instances of Universal succession such as the Bonorum Possessio grew out of the notion of the hereditas ; and it was found convenient to extend it to other cases, such as Adrogation. But, as already observed, the extension
of the notion was not left to the pleasure of individuals, and accordingly this doctrine was, to use a Roman phrase, Juris Publici.
The words Successio, Successor, Succedere by themselves have a general meaning and comprise both kinds of Succession. Sometimes these words by themselves signify universal succession, as appears from the context (Gains, iii. 82), and by such expressions as heredes ceterique successores. In other cases the kind of succession is denoted by appropriate words as per universitatem succedere, acquirere, transire, in universum jus succedere, &c. in the case of Universal Succession ; and in rem, in rei dominium, in singularum rerum dominium succedere, &c. in the case of Singular Succession.
In the phrase "per universitatem succedere" the notion of universal succession is not directly expressed ; for the phrase has immediate reference to the acquisition of a single thing, and it is only by means of the word Universitas that we express the notion, that the acquisition of the individual thing is effected by means of the acquisition of the whole.
(Savigny, System, £c. iii. p. 8 ; Gaius, ii. 97, &c. ; Puchta, Inst. ii. § 198.) [G. L.]
SUDATIO, SUDATO'RIUM. [balneae, p. 190, b.]
SUFFIBULUM. [vestales.] SUFFRA'GIA SEX. [equites, p. 472, b.] SUFFRA'GIUM, a vote. At Athens the voting in the popular assemblies and the courts of justice was either by show of hands or by ballot, as is explained under cheirotonia and psephus. It is commonly supposed that at Rome the people were always polled in the comitia by word of mouth, till the passing of the Leges Tabellariae about the middle of the second century before Christ [tabellariae leges], when the ballot by means of tabellae was introduced. [tabella.] Wunder (Codex Erfutensis, p. clxvii. &c.) however has shown, that the popular assemblies voted by ballot, as well as by word of mouth, long before the passing of the Leges Tabellariae, but that instead of using tabellae they employed stones or pebbles (the Greek ^Tj^of), and that each voter received two stones, one white and the other black, the former to be used in the approval and the latter in the condemnation of a measure. The voting by word of mouth seems to have been adopted in elections and trials, and the use of pebbles to have been confined to the enactment and repeal of laws. That the latter mode of voting was adopted in early times is proved by many passages of Dionysiiis, and especially by x. 41 : air-prei r&s fyfityovs, ol vec&raroi twv — t& ayye'ia T<av tyyfycav rovs ; and by xi. 52 : e/ce\euo-c«/
els %v a.TroO'fja-ovTai ras tytyovs. It is also confirmed by the common expressions used with respect to voting, as suffragium ferre, mittere in suff-ragia, inire, or ire in suffragia, which lead us to suppose that the suffragium probably signified something which was put by the hand from one place into another. For if the Romans had from the first been polled only by word of mouth, it is scarcely possible that such an expression as suffragium ferre would have been used, when they had nothing to carry ; but on the contrary, some such