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,no writings. If must not, however, be assumed that Coruncanius was a professor of law in the modern sense of the term ; nor any other of the jurists after him who are enumerated by Pomponius. Before the time of Cicero the study of the law had become a distinct branch from the study of oratory, and a man might raise himself to eminence in the state lay his reputation as a lawyer, as well ns by his oratorical power or military skill. There were many distinguished jurists in the last two centuries of the republican period, among whom are M'. Manilius ; P. Mucius Scaevola, Pontifex .Maximus (b. c. 131) \ Q. Mucius Scaevola, the augur ; and Q. Mucius Scaevola, the son of Publius, who was consul b. c. 95, and afterwards Pontifex Maximus, and one of the masters of Cicero (jttris-peritorum eloquentissimzes., eloquentium jicnsperitissi-mus, Cic. de Or. i. 39, Brutus, c. 89). This Scaevola the Pontifex, was considered to have been the first who gave the Jus Civile a systematic form, by a treatise in eighteen books. (Dig. 1. tit. 2. s. 2. § 41.) There are four excerpts in the Digest from a work of his in .one book, on Definitions. Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the friend and contemporary of Cicero, and consul b, c, 51 (Brut. 7, 40), was as .great an orator as the Pontifex Scaevolci, and more distinguished as a jurist. Many persons, both his predecessors and contemporaries, had a good practical knowledge of the law, but he was the first who handled it in a scientific manner, and as he had both numerous hearers and was a voluminous writer, we may view him as the founder of that methodical treatment of the matter of law which characterised the subsequent Roman jurists (Cic. Brut. 41 ; Dig. 1. tit. 2. s. 2. § 43), and in which they have been seldom surpassed.
The jurists of the imperial times are distinguished from those of the republican period by two circumstances, the Jus Respondendi, and the rise of two Schools of Law.
It is said that Augustus determined that the Jurisconsult! should give their responsa under his sanction (ex auctoritate ejus respondereni). The jurists who had not received this mark of imperial favour, were not excluded from giving opinions ; but the opinions of such jurists would have little weight in comparison with those of the privileged class. Those who obtained the Jus Respondendi from the Princeps, would from this circumstance alone have a greater authority, for formally their Responsa were founded on the authority of the Princeps. These responsa were given sealed (sig-nata\ apparently to prevent falsification. The matter proposed for the opinion of the Jurisconsulti was sometimes stated in the Responsiim, either fully or briefly ; and the Responsiim itself was sometimes short, sometimes long ; sometimes it contained the grounds of the opinion, and sometimes it did not. (Brisson. de Form. iii. e.- 85 — 87.)
The responsa of a privileged jufisconsuttus would be an authority for the decision of a" ju'dex ; if there were conflicting responsa giten,- the jitde'x would of course decide as he best eoiild. But, besides the direct responsa, which wefe given in particular cases, there was the authority of the writings of the privileged jurists. As before the time of Augustus, public opinion only gave authority to a jurist's responsa and writings, so from the time of Augustus this authority was given by the Jus Respondendi to the responsa and writings of
a jurist. This privilege gave to a jurist the condition of a Juris auctor, and to his writings legal authority, neither of which belonged to a jurist who had not received the privilege. Accordingly, the writings of such privileged jurists received the same authority as their responsa ; and if the opinions of the Juris auctores, as expressed in their writings, did not agree, the Judex was left to decide as he best could. This explanation of the nature of the Jus Respondendi, which is by Puehta (Instit. i. § 117), is applied by him to the elucidation of the passage in Gaius (i. 7. Responsa prudentium sunt sententiae et opiniones, &c.). He supposes that this interpretation of the passage is strictly conformable to what has been said of the authority of the writings of the jurists. If we leave out of consideration the technical expression Responsa, with which the passage begins, there is no difficulty at all in applying the words of Gaius to the writings of the jurists j. and, in fact, it is most consistent to take responsa in this passage in a wider sense, and as equivalent to auctoritas. The term Responsa originated at a time when responsa, in the simple sense of the term, were the only form in which the auctoritas of a jurist was manifested ; whereas in the time of Gaius, the writings of the jurists had become a very important legal authority, and consequently they must be included by Gaius in the term Responsa Prudentium, for otherwise he would not have mentioned at all the Auctoritas Prudentium, to which he so often refers in various parts of his work. Puchta's explanation of this passage, which bears the stamp of great probability, may be compared with that of Savigny (System, &c. vol. i. p. 155),
In the time of Augustus there arose two schools (scholae) of Jurists, the heads of which were respectively Ateius Capito and Antistius Labeo. The followers of Labeo, whom we know with certainty to have been such, were Nerva, Proculus, Nerva the son, Pegasus, Celsus, Celsus the son, and Neratius Priscus. The followers of Capito were Massurius Sabinus, C. Cassius Longinus, Coelius Sabinus, Prisctfs Javolenus, Aburnus Valens Tus-cianus, Gaius, and probably Pomponius. But the schools did not take their names from Labeo and Capito. The followers cf Labeo were named Pro-culiani, from Proculus. The followers of Capito derived their name of Sabiniani from Massurius Sabintts, who lived under Tiberius, and as late as the reign of Nero; they were sometimes also called Cassiani, from C. Cassius Longinus. It is not easy to state with precision the differences which characterised the two schools. Whatever may have been the origin of these differences, which may perhaps be partly referred to the personal character of Capito and Lubeo, the schools were subsequently distinguished by a difference in their manner of handling the matter of the law. The school of Capito adhered more closely to what was established, and to the letter of what was written. Labeo was a man of greater acquirements than Capito, and his school looked more to the internal meaning th'£n to the external form, and thus, while apparently deviating from the letter, they approached nearer to true results ; though the strict logic of this school might sometimes produce a result less adapted to general convenience than the conclusions of the Sabiniani, which were based on the prevailing notions of equity. Much has been written on the characteristics of the two schools,