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matter ; but the heres of a fidejussor was bound. By the Lex Furia, a sponsor and fidepromissor were fre*j from all liability after two years, which appears to mean two years after the obligation had become a present demand ; but the Lex Furia only applied to Italy. All of them who were alive at the time when the money became due could be sued, but each only for his share (singuli viriles paries'). Fidejussores were never released from their obligation by length of time, and each was liable for the whole sum (singuli in solidum olligantur} ; but by a rescript (epistola} of Hadrian, the creditor was required to sue the solvent fidejussores separately, each according to his proportion. If any one of them was not solvent, his share became a burden to the rest.
A Lex Apuleia, which was passed before the Lex Furia, gave one of several sponsores or fide-promissores, who had paid more than his share, an action against the rest for contribution. Before the passing of this Lex Apuleia, any one sponsor or fidepromissor might be sued for the whole amount; but this lex was obviously rendered useless by the subsequent Lex Furia, at least in Italy, to which country alone, as already observed, the Lex Furia applied, while the Lex Apuleia extended to place§ out of Italy ; yet not to fidejussores.
A fidejussor, who had been compelled to pay the whole amount, had no redress if his principal was insolvent ; though, as already observed, he could by the rescript of Hadrian compel the creditor to limit his demand against him to his share.
A creditor was obliged formally to declare his acceptance of the sponsores or fidepromissores who were offered to him, and also to declare what was the object as to which they were securitj ; if he did not comply with this legal requisition, the sponsores and fidepromissores might, within thirty days (it is not said what thirty days, but probably thirty days from the time of the sureties being offered), demand a praejudicium (praejudicium pos-tulare}, and if they proved that the creditor had not complied with the requisitions of the law, they were released. (Gaius, iii. 123.)
A Lex Cornelia limited the amount for which any person could be a security for the same person to the same person within the same year, but with some exceptions, one of which was a security " dotis nomine." No person could be bound in a greater amount than his principal, but he might be bound in less ; and every surety could recover on a inandati judicium from his principal whatever he had been compelled to pay on his account. By a Lex Publilia sponsores had a special action in duplum, which was called an actio depensi.
There is a passage in the Epitome of Gaius in the Breviarium (ii. 9. § 2), which is not taken from Gaius: it is to this effect •—The creditor may sue either the debtor or his fidejussor ; but after he has chosen to sue one of them, he cannot sue the other. — Cicero appears to allude to the same doctrine (ad Att. xvi. 15) in a passage which is somewhat obscure, and is variously explained. The subject of the sponsio often occurs in Cicero's letters ; and in one case he was called upon in respect of a sponsio alleged to have been given by him twenty-five years before (ad Att. xii. 17). Cicero uses the expression " appellare " to express calling on a surety to pay (ad Att. i. 8).
(Gaius, iii. 115—127 ; Inst. iii. tit. 20 ; Dig. 44. tit. 7 ; 46. tit. 1.)
Women generally were incapacitated from doing many acts on account of the weakness of the sex. It was a general rule that any person might " in-tercedere." who was competent to contract and to dispose of his property ; but minores xxv and women had only a limited capacity in respect of their contracts and the disposition of their estates. In the early part of the reign of Augustus and in that of Claudius, it was declared by the Edict that women should not " intereedere " for their husbands. Subsequently the Senatusconsultum Velleianum [senatuscgnsultum velleianum] absolutely prohibited all Intercessio by women ; and the Novella 134. c. 8, had for its special object to make null all Intereessio of a wife for her husband. A woman who was sued in respect of her Intercessio, or her heres, might plead the Senatusconsultum, and she might recover anything that she had paid in respect of her Intercessio. The Senatusconsultum, though it made null the intercessio of a woman, protected the creditor so far as to restore to him a former right of action against his debtor and fidejussores : this action was called Restitutoria or Rescissoria. In the case of a new contract, to which the woman was a party, the Intercessio was null by the Senatusconsultum, and the creditor had the same action against the person for whom the woman " intercessit," as he would have had against the woman : this action, inasmuch as the contract had no reference to a former right, but to a right arising out of the eon tract, was Institutoria. In certain cases, a woman was permitted to renounce the benefit of the Senatusconsultum ; and there was a considerable number of exceptions to the rule that a woman could plead the Senatusconsultum.
(Dig. 16. tit. 1. ad S. C. Velleianum ; Paulus, S. R. ii. tit. 11 ; Vangerow, Pandekten, &c. iii. p. 149.) [G. L.]
INTERCESSIO was the interference of ama-gistratus to whom an appeal [appellatio] was nia'de. The object of the Intercessio was to put a stop to proceedings, on the ground of informality or other sufficient cause. Any magistratus might "intereedere," who was of equal rank with or of rank superior to the magistratus from or against whom the appeUatio1 was. Cases occur in which one of tli e praetora interposed (intercessit} against the proceedings of his colleague. (Cic. in Verr. i. 46.)
The Intercessio is most frequently spoken of with reference to the Tribunes who originally had not jurisdictio, but used the Intercessio for the purpose of preventing wrong which was offered to a person in their presence (Gell. xiii. 12). The Intercessio of the Tribunes of the Plebs, was Auxilium (Liv. vi. 38 ; Cic. pro Quintio^ 7, 20) ; and it might be exercised either in jure or in judicio. The tribune qui intercessit could prevent a judicium from being instituted. That there eonid be an Intercessio after the Litis Contestatio appears from Cicero (pro Tullio, 38). The tribunes could also use the Intercessio to prevent execution of a judicial sentence. (Liv. vi. 27.) T. Gracchus interfered (intercessit} against the praetor Terentius, who was going to order execution, in the case of L. Scipio who was condemned for peculation (Liv. xxxviii. 60 ; Gell. vii. 19), and he prevented Scipio being sent to prison, but he did not interfere to prevent execution being had on his property. A single r-e could effect this, and against the opinion o£