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cally correct. (Instances of relegatio occur in the following passages : — Suet. Aug. c. 16, Tib. c. 50 ; Tacit. Ann. iii. 17, 68 ; Suet. Claud, c. 23, which last, as the historian remarks, was a new kind of relegatio.) The term relegatio is applied "by Cicero (de Off. iii. 31) to the case of T. Manlius, who had been compelled by his father to live in solitude in the country.
Deportatio in insidam, or deportatio simply, was introduced under the emperors in place of the aquae et ignis interdictio. (Ulpian, Dig. 48. tit. 13. s. 3; tit. 19. s. 2.) The governor of a province (prueses), had not the power of pronouncing the sentence of deportatio ; but this power was given to the praefectus tirbi by a rescript of the emperor Severus. The consequence of deportatio was loss of property and citizenship, but not of freedom. Though the deportatus ceased to be a Roman citizen, he had the capacity to buy and sell, and do other acts which might be done according to the jus gentium. Deportatio differed from relegatio, as already shown, and also in being always for an indefinite time. The relegatus went into banishment; the deportatus was conducted to his place of banishment, sometimes in chains.
As the exsilium in the special sense, and the deportatio took away a person's civitas, it follows that if he was a father, his children ceased to be in his power; and if he was a son, he ceased to be in his father's power; for the relationship expressed by the terms patria potestas could not exist \vhen either party had ceased to be a Roman citizen. (Gains, i. 128.) Relegatio of a father or of a son, of course, had not this effect. But the interdict and the deportatio did not dissolve marriage. (Cod. 5. tit. 16. s. 24 ; tit. 17. s. 1; compare Gaius, i. 128, with the Institutes, i. tit. 12, in which the deportatio stands in the place of the aquae et ignis interdictio of Gaius.)
When a person, either parent or child, was condemned to the mines or to fight with wild beasts, the relation of the patria .potestas was dissolved. This, though not reckoned a species of exsilium, resembled deportatio in its consequences.
It remains to examine the meaning of the term exsilium in the republican period, and to ascend, so far as we can, to its origin. Cicero (Pro Caecina, c. 34) affirms that no Roman was ever deprived of his civitas or his freedom by a lex. In the oration Pro Domo (c. 16,17) he makes the same assertion, but in a qualified way; he says that no special lex, that is, no primlegium, could be passed against the caput of a Roman citizen, unless he was first condemned in a judicium. It was, according to Cicero, a fundamental principle of Roman law (Pro Domo, c. 29), that no Roman citizen could lose his freedom or his citizenship without his consent. He adds, that Roman citizens who went out as Latin colonists, could not become Latin, unless they went voluntarily and registered their names: those who were condemned of capital crimes did not lose their citizenship till they were admitted as citizens of another state ; and this was effected, not by depriving them of their civitas (ademptio civitatis}, but by the interdictio tecti aquae et ignis. The same thing is stated in the oration Pro Caecina (c. 34), with the addition, that a Roman citizen, when he was received into another state, lost his citizenship at Rome, because by the Roman law a man could not be a citizen of two states. Thi§ reason, however, would be equaHy
good for showing that a Roman citizen could not become a citizen of another community. In the
oration Pro Balbo (c. 11) the proposition is put rather in this form ; that a Roman who became a citizen of another state, thereby ceased to be a Roman citizen. It must not be forgotten that in the oration Pro Caecina, it is one of Cicero's objects to prove that his client had the rights of a Roman citizen; and in the oration Pro Domo, to prove that he himself had not been an exsul, though he was interdicted from fire and water within 400 miles of Rome. (Cic. Ad Attic, iii. 4.) Now, as Cicero had been interdicted from fire and water, and as he evaded the penalty, to use his own words (Pro Caecina c. 34), by going beyond the limits, he could only escape the consequences, namel}r, exsilium, either by relying on the fact of his not being received as a citizen into another state, or by alleging the illegality of the proceedings against him. But the latter is the ground on which he seems to maintain his case in the Pro Domo: he alleges that he was made the subject of a privi-legium, without having been first condemned in a judicium (c. 17).
In the earlier republican period, a Roman citizen might have a right to go into exsilium to another state, or a citizen of another state might have a right to go into exsilium at Rome, by virtue of certain isopolitical relations existing between such state and Rome. This right was called jus exulandi with reference to the state to which the person came ; with respect to his own state which he left, he was exul, and his condition was exsilium : with respect to the state which he entered, he was inquilinus*; and at Rome he might attach himself (applicare se) to a quasi patronus, a relationship which gave rise to questions involving the jus applications.
The sentence of aquae et ignis, to which Cicero adds (Pro Domo, c. 30) tecti interdictio (comp. Plut. Marius, c. 29), was equivalent to the deprivation of the chief necessaries of life, and its effect was to incapacitate a person from exercising the rights of a citizen within the limits which the sentence comprised. Supposing it to be true, that no Roman citizen could in direct terms be deprived of his civitas, it requires but little knowledge of the history of Roman jurisprudence to perceive that a way would readily be discovered of doing that indirectly which could not be done directty ; and such, in fact, was the aquae et ignis interdictio. The meaning of the sentence of aquae et ignis interdictio is clear when we consider the symbolical meaning of the aqua et ignis. Tha bride, on the day of her marriage, was received ty her husband with fire and water (Dig. 24. tit. 1, s. 66), which were symbolical of his taking her under his protection and sustentation. Varro (De Ling. Lat. iv.) gives a different explanation of the symbolical meaning of aquae et ignis in the marriage ceremony :—Aquae et ignis (according to the expression of Festus) sunt duo elementa quae liumanam vitam maccimc continent. The sentence of interdict was either pronounced in a judicium, or it was the subject of a lex. The punishment
* This word appears, by its termination inus, to denote a person who was one of a class, like the word libertinus. The prefix in appears to be the correlative of ex in exsul, and the remaining part quit, is probably related to col in incola, and colonus,