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of this assembly is not mentioned, it existed long before the Persian wars, and that in many cases in which the magistrates (re'Tuj, &pxovtgs or «pxa0 are said to have made decrees, the magistrates are mentioned instead of the eK/c\7jTot, of whom they were the chief members. This last supposition is rejected by Mtiller (Dor, iii. 5. § 10), who observes that the magistrates were often said to have decreed a measure (especially in foreign affairs), though it had been discussed before the whole assembly and approved by it; for the magistrates were the representatives and the organs of the assembly, and acted in its name. Muller is also of opinion that €KK\r)Toi and fKK\v](ria are identical, and distinct from the lesser assembly, which he considers to have been a kind of select assembly, But his arguments on this point are not convincing. The €KK\r)Tot and the lesser assembly are mentioned about the same time in Grecian history, and previous to that time we hear of no assembly, except the regular €KK\r](ria, of all the Spartans, (See Xen.JM..v. ii. § 33, vi. 3. § 3.) [L.S.]
ECDICUS (e/c5i/cos), the name of an officer in many of the towns of Asia Minor during the Roman dominion, whose principal duty was the care of the public money, and the prosecution of all parties who owed money to the state. The word is translated in the ancient glossaries by cognitoi\ an attorney. (Cic. ad Fam. xiii. 56 ; Plin. Ep. x. Ill ; Gronovius, deSestert. iv. 3. p. 277.) E'CDOSIS (Ifcfowns). [fenus.] ECHTNOS (e'x^os). [dike.] ECLOGEIS (€KAo76?s). [eisphora.] ECMARTY'RIA (^aprvpia), signifies the deposition of a witness, who, by reason of absence abroad, or illness, was unable to attend in court. His statement was taken down in writing, in the presence of persons expressly appointed to receive it, and afterwards, upon their swearing to its identity, was read as evidence in the cause. They were said /-cap-Tupe?*/ r)]i> e/c/^aprupiav : the absent^ witness, eK/Aaprvpew: the party who procured the evidence, eK^aprvpiav 7roie?cr0cu. It was considered as the testimony of the deponent himself, not that of the certifying witnesses, and therefore did not come within the description of hearsay evidence, which (except the declaration of a deceased person) was not admissible at Athens. The law was, clko^v elvcu [JiapTvpziv Tefo/ewros, eKfJLapTvpiav 8e vwepopiov Kal dSwarov. The deponent (like any other witness) was liable to an action for false testimony if the contents of the deposition were untrue, unless he could show that it was incorrectly taken down or forged, in which case the certifying witnesses would be liable. Therefore (Isaeus tells us) it was usual to select persons of good character to receive such evidence, and to have as many of them as possible (Isaeus, De Pyrr. Hered. 23, 24, ed. Bekk. ; Dem. c. Stepli. pp. 1130, 1131.) [martyria.] [C. R, K.] E'CPHORA (l«<J>op<£). [funus.] ECPH YLLOPHO'RIA (4K<t>v\\o<j>opia). [Ex-
ECULEUS. [equuleus.] E'DERE ACTIO'NEM. [AcTio.] EDICTUM. The Jus Edicendi, or power of making edicts, belonged to the higher magistratus populi Romani, but it was principally exercised by the two praetors, the praetor urbanus and the praetor peregrinus, whose jurisdiction was exercised in tho provinces by the praeses. The curule aediles
also made many edicts, and their jurisdiction was exercised (under the empire at least) in the pro-» vinciae populi Romani by the quaestors. (Gaius, i. 6.) There was no edict promulgated in the pro-vinciae Caesaris. The tribunes, censors, and ponti-fices also promulgated edicts relating to the matters of their respective jurisdictions. The edicta are enumerated by Gaius among the sources of Roman law, and this part of the Roman law is sometimes called in the Pandect, Jus Honorarium (Dig. 44. tit. 7. s. 52), apparently because the edictal power belonged to those magistrates only who had the honores, and not so much ad honorem praetorum. (Dig. 1. tit. 1. s. 7.) As the edicts of the praetors were the most important, the jus honorarium was sometimes called jus praetorium ; but, properly, the jus honorarium was the term under which was comprehended all the edictal law.
Edictum signifies, generally, any public notice made by a competent authority (Tacit. Ann. i. 7 ; Liv. xxxi. 6, ii. 30). But it specially signifies, under the republic, a rule promulgated by a magistratus, which was done by writing it on an album, and placing it in a conspicuous place, " Unde de piano recte legi potest." From this circumstance, the Edict was considered to be a part of the jus scriptum. As the office of a magistratus was annual, the rules promulgated by a predecessor were not binding on a successor, but he might confirm or adopt the rules of his predecessor, and introduce them into his own Edict, and hence such adopted rules were called edictum tralatitium (Cic. ad Ait. iii. 23, v. 21 ; ad Fain. iii. 8 ; in Verr. i. 45), or vetus, as opposed to edictum novum. A repentinum edictum was that rule which was made (prout res incidit) for the occasion. (In Verr. iii. 14.) A perpetuum edictum was that rule which was made by the magistratus on entering upon office, and which was intended to apply to all cases to which it was applicable, during the year of his office:-hence it was sometimes called also annua lex. It was not called perpetuum because the rules were fixed, but because each praetor published his edict upon entering on his office, and thus there was a perpetuum (continuous) edictum. Until it became the practice for magistratus to adopt the edicta of their predecessors, the edicta could not form a body of permanent binding rules ; but when this practice became common, the edicta (edictum tralatitium) soon constituted a large body of law, which was practically of as much importance as any other part of the law. The several edicta, when thus established, were designated by the names of their promulgators, as the Edictum Carbonianum ; or they were named with reference to the formula, and the actio which they established, as Aquiliana, Publiciana, Rutiliana.
The origin of the edictal power cannot be historically shown ; but as the praetor was a magistrate established for the administration of justice on account of the occupations of the consuls, and the consular power was the representative of the kingly power, it seems that the jus edicendi may have been a remnant of the kingly prerogative. However this may be, the edictal power was early exercised, and so far established, that the jus praetorium was a recognised division of law in and before the time of Cicero (in Verr. i. 44), in whose age the study of the Edict formed a part of the regular study of the law. (de Leg. i. 5, ii. 23.) The edict of the aediles about the buying and