Scanned text contains errors.
and when at home, they took whatever measures were requisite to forward the military operations of the league, or of their own state: for example, we read of one of the Theban Boeotarchs ordering the Thebans to come in" arms to the ecclesia for the purpose of being ready to attack Plataea. (Paus. ix. 1. § 3.) Each state of the confederacy elected one Boeotarch, the Thebans two (Thuc. ii. 2, iv. 91, vii. 30 ; Diod. xv. 51) ; although on one occasion, i. e. after the return of the exiles with Pelopidas (b. c. 379), we read of there being three at Thebes. (Pint. Pelop. 13). The total number from the whole confederacy varied with the number of the independent states. Mention is made of the Boeotarchs by Thucydides (iv. 91), in connection with the battle of Delium (b. c. 424). There is, hoivever, a difference of opinion with respect to his meaning : some understand him to speak of eleven, some of twelve, and others of thirteen Boeotarchs. Dr. Arnold is disposed to adopt the last number; and we think the context is in favour of the opinion that there were then thirteen Boeotarchs, so that the number of free states was twelve. At the time of the battle of Leuctra (b. c. 371), we find seven Boeotarchs mentioned (Diod. xv. 52, 53 ; Paus. ix. 13. § 3); on another occasion, when Greece was invaded by the Gauls (b. c. 279), we read of four. Livy (xlii. 43) states that there were twelve, but before the time (b. c. 171) to which his statement refers, Plataea had been reunited to the league. Still the number mentioned in any case is no test of the actual number, inasmuch as we are not sure that all the Boeotarchs were sent out by their respective states on every expedition or to every battle.
The Boeotarchs, when engaged in military service, formed a council of war, the decisions of which were determined by a majority of votes, the president being one of the two Theban Boeotarchs who commanded alternately. (Thuc. iv. 91; Diod. xv. 51.) Their period of service was a year, beginning about the winter solstice ; and whoever continued in office longer than his time, was punishable with death both at Thebes and in other cities (Plut. Pelop. 24 ; Paus.ix. 14. § 3.) Epameinondas arid Pelopidas did so on then? invasion of Laconia (b. c. 369), but their eminent services saved them ; in fact the judges did not even come to a vote respecting the former. At the expiration of the year a Boeotarch was eligible to office a second time, and Pelopidas was repeatedly chosen. From the case of Epameinondas and Pelopidas, who were brought before Theban judges (Si/cao-rcu), for transgression of the law which limited the time of office, we may conclude that each Boeotarch was responsible to his own state alone, and not to the general body of the four councils.
Mention is made of an election of Boeotarchs by Livy (xxxiii. 27, xlii. 44). He further informs us that the league (concilium) was broken up by the Romans b.c. 171. (Compare Polyb. xxviii. 2» § 10 —rb boiwt&j/ eOvos /careAvflr?.) Still it must have been partially revived, as we are told of a second breaking up by the Romans after the de struction of Corinth b. c. 146* (Paus. vii. 16* § 6.) [R. W.]
emtio, cessio, possessio, ususfructus, the word " bona " is equivalent to property. It expresses all that a man has, whether as owner or merely as possessor; and every thing to which he has any right. But it is said (Dig. 50. tit. 16. s. 83) : " Proprie bona dici non possunt quae plus incom-modi quam commodi habent." However, the use of the word in the case of universal succession comprehended both the commodum and incommo-dum of that which passed to the universal successor. But the word bona is simply the property as an object; it does not express the nature of the relation between it and the person who has the ownership or the enjoyment of it, any more than the words "all that I have," "all that I am worth," " all my property," in English show tha legal relation of a man to that which he thus describes. The legal expression in bonis, as opposed to dominium, or Quiritarian ownership, and the nature of the distinction will be easily apprehended by any person who is slightly conversant with English law.
" There is," says Gaius (ii. 40), "amongforeigners (peregrini) only one kind of ownership (dominium), so that a man is either the owner of a thing or he is not. And this was formerly the case among the Roman people ; for a man was either owner ex jure Quiritium, or he was not. But afterwards the ownership was split, so that now one man may be the owner (dominus) of a thing ex jure Quiritium, and yet another may have it in bonis. For instance, if, in the case of a res mancipi, I do not transfer it to you by mancipatio, nor by the form in jure eessio, but merely deliver it to you, the thing indeed becomes your thing (in bonis), but it will remain mine ex jure Quiritium, until by possession you have it by usucapion. For when the usuca-pion is once complete, from that time it begins to be yours absolutely (plenojure),ih&t is, it is yours both in bonis and also yours ex jure Quiritium, just as if it had been mancipated to you, or transferred to you by the in jure cessio." In this passage Gaius refers to the three modes of acquiring property which were the peculiar rights of Roman citizens^ mancipatio, in jure cessio, and usucapion, which are also particularly enumerated by him in another passage (ii. 65).
From this passage it appears that the ownership of certain kinds of things among the Romans, called res mancipi [mancipium], could only be transferred from one person to another with certain formalities., or acquired by usucapion. But if it was clearly the intention of the owner to transfer the ownership, and the necessary forms only were wanting, the purchaser had the thing in bonis, and he had the enjoyment of it,, though the original owner was legally the owner until the usucapion was completed, notwithstanding he had parted with the thing.
It thus appears that Quiritarian ownership of res mancipi originally and properly signified that ownership of a thing which the Roman law recognised as such; it did not express a compound but a simple notion, which was that of absolute ownership. But when it was once established that one man might have the Quiritarian ownership, and another the enjoyment, and the sole right to the enjoyment of the same thing, the complete notion of Quiritarian ownership became a notion compounded of the strict legal notion of ownership, and that of the right to enjoy, as united