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argument of Zeno, inasmuch as he conceives the unit as having no magnitude, and hence as incor­poreal, that is, according to the materialistic views, as not existing at all, although with regard to variety, he observes that it presupposes the exist­ence of units. The second section concludes that, if existence were ascef tainable or cognizable, every­thing which is ascertained or thought must be real; but, he continues, things which are ascertainable through the medium of our senses do not exist, because they are conceived, but exist even when they are not conceived. The third section urges the fact, that it is not existence which is communi­cated, but only words, and that words are intelli­gible only by their reference to corresponding per­ceptions ; but even then intelligible only approxi-matively, since no two persons ever perfectly agreed in their perceptions or sentiments, nay, not even one and the same person agreed with himself at different times. (Comp. Fosss, pp. 107 —18.5.)

However little such a mode of arguing might stand the test of a sound dialectical examination, yet it could not but direct attention to the insuffi­ciency of the abstractions of the Eleatics, and call forth more careful investigations concerning the nature and forms of our knowledge and cognition, and thus contribute towards the removal of the later scepticism, the germs of which were contained in the views entertained by Gorgias himself. He himself seems soon to have renounced this sophis­tical schematism, and to have turned his attention entirely to rhetorical and practical pursuits. Plato at least notices only one of those argumentations, and does not even speak of that one in the ani­mated description which he gives of ttte peculiari­ties of Gorgias in the dialogue bearing his name, but in the Euihydemus (p. 284, 86, &c.). Isocrates (Helen. Laudat.), however, mentions the book itself.

Gorgias, as described by Plato, avoids general definitions, even of virtue and morality, and con­fines himself to enumerating and characterising the particular modes in which they appear, according to the differences of age, sex, &c., and that not without a due appreciation of real facts, as is clear from an expression of Aristotle, in which he recog­nises this merit. (Plat. Meno, p. 71, &c.; comp. Aristot. PoKt. i. 9. § 13.) Gorgias further expressly declared, that he did not profess to impart virtue— as Protagoras and other sophists did—but only the power of speaking or eloquence (Plat. Meno,ip.95t Gorg. p. 452, Phileb. p. 58), and he preferred the name of a rhetorician to that of a sophist (Plat. Gorg. p. 520 a, 449, 452) ; but on the supposition that oratory comprehended and was the master of all our other powers and faculties. (Ib. p. 456, 454.) The ancients themselves were uncertain whether they should call him an orator or a sophist. (Cic. de Invent, i. 5 ; Lucian, Macrob. 23.)

In his explanations of the phaenomena of nature, though without attaching any importance to phy­sics, Gorgias seems to have followed in the foot­steps of Empedocles, whose disciple he is called, though in all probability not correctly. (Diog. Lae'rt. viii. 58 ; Plat. Meno, p. 76, Gorg. p. 453; comp. Dionys. de Isocrat. 1.)

The eloquence of Gorgias, and probably that of his Sicilian contemporary Tisias also, was chiefly calculated to tickle the ear by antitheses, by com­binations of words of similar sound, by the sym-


metry of its parts and similar artifices (Diod. xii. 53; Cic. Orat. 49, 52; Dionys. Hal. passim}, and to dazzle by metaphors, hypallagae, allegories, re­petitions, apostrophes, and the like (Suidas ; Dio­nys. Hal. passim) ; by novel images, poetical circumlocutions, and high-sounding expressions, and sometimes also by a strain of irony. (Aristot. Rhet. iii. 17, 8 ; Xenoph. Symp. 2 ; Aristot. Rhet. iii. 1, 3, 14; Philostr. p. 492 ; Dionys. de Lys. 3.) He. lastly tried to charm his hearers by a sym­metrical arrangement of his periods. (Demetr. de Elocut. 15.) But as these artifices, in the applica­tion of which he is said to have often shown real grandeur, earnestness, and elegance (/^ccA-oTrpe-TT€iav Kal (re/uLVorriTa Kal Ka\\i\oyiav, Dionys. de Admir. m Demosth. 4), were made use of too pro­fusely, and, for the purpose of giving undue pro­minence to poor thoughts, his orations did not excite the feelings of his hearers (Aristot. Rhet. iii. 3, 17; Longin. de Sublim. iii. 12 ; Hermog. de Ideis, i. 6, ii. 9 ; Dionys. passim}, and at all events could produce only a momentary impression. This was the case with his oration addressed to the assembled Greeks at Olympia, exhorting them to union against their common enemy (Aristot. Rhet. iii. 14; Philostr. p. 493), and with the funeral oration which he wrote at Athens, though he pro­bably did not deliver it in public. (Philostr. p. 493; and the fragment preserved by the Schol. on Her-mogenes, in Geel, p. 60, &c., and Foss, p. 69, &c.) Besides these and similar show-speeches of which we know no more than the titles (Geel, p. 33; Foss, p. 76, &c.), Gorgias wrote loci communes pro­bably as rhetorical exercises, to show how subjects might be looked at from opposite points of view. (Cic. Brut. 12.) The same work seems to be re­ferred to under the title Onomasticon. (Pollux,ix. 1.) We have besides mention of a work on dissimilar and homogeneous words (Dionys. de Comp. Verb. p. 67, ed. Reiske), and another on rhetoric (Applied. ap. Diog. LatrL viii. 58, Cic. Brut. 12; Quintil. iii. 1. § 3; Suidas), unless one of the before-men­tioned works is t6 be understood by this title.

Respecting the genuineness of the two declama-r tions which have come down to us under the name of Gorgias, viz. the Apology of Palamedes, and the Encomium on Helena, which is maintained by Reiske, Geel (p. 48, &c.), and Schonborn (Dis-sertat. de Authentia Dedamationum, quae Gorgiae Leontini nomine extant, Breslau, 1826), and doubted by Foss (p. 80, &c.) and 'others, it is difficult to give any decisive opinion, since the characteristic peculiarities of the oratory of Gorgias, which appear in these declamations, especially in the former, might very well have been imitated by a skilful rhetorician of later times.

The works of Gorgias did not even contain the elements of a scientific theory of oratory, any more than his oral instructions ; he confined himself to teaching his pupils a variety of rhetorical artifices, and made them learn by heart certain formulas re­ lative to them (Aristot. Elench. Soph. ii. 9), al­ though there is no doubt that his lectures here and there contained remarks which were very much to the point. (Aristot. Rhet. iii. 18; comp. Cic. de Orat. ii. 59.) [A. Ch. B.]

GORGIAS (Topylas\ of Athens, a rhetorician of the time of Cicero. Young M. Cicero, when at Athens, received instructions from Gorgias in de­clamation, but his father desired him to dismiss him. (Cic. ad Fain. xvi. 21.) It appears from

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