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AENESIDEMUS.

is to shew how a siege should be resisted, the va­rious kinds of instruments to be used, manoeuvres to be practised, ways of sending letters without being detected, and without even the bearers know­ing about it (c. 31, a very curious one), &c. It contains a good deal of information on many points in archaeology, and is especially valuable as con­taining a large stock of words and technical terms connected with warfare, denoting instruments, &c., which are not to be found in any other work. From the same circumstance, many passages are difficult.

The book was first discovered by Simler in the Vatican library. It was edited first by Isaac Casaubon with a Latin version and notes, and ap­ pended to his edition of Polybius. (Paris, 1609.) It was republished by Gronovius in his Polybius, vol. iii. Amsterdam, 1670, and by Ernesti, Leipzig, 1763. The last edition is that of J. C. Orelli, Leipzig, 1818, with Casaubon's version and notes and an original commentary, published as a supple­ ment to Schweighaeuser's Polybius. Besides the Vatican MS. there are three at Paris, on which Casaubon founded his edition, and one in the Lau- rentian library at Florence. This last is, according to Orelli (Praef. p. 6), the oldest of all. The work contains many very corrupt and mutilated passages. An epitome of the whole book, not of the frag­ ment now remaining, was made by Cineas, a Thes- salian, who was sent to Rome by Pyrrhus, 279, B. c. (Aelian, Tact. 1.) This abridgment is re­ ferred to by Cicero (ad Fam. ix. 25). [A. A.] AENE'IUS or AENE'SIUS (Aivjios or Alwf- ffios\ a surname of Zeus, under which he was worshipped in the island of Cephalenia, where he had a temple on mount Aenos. (Hes. ap. Scliol. ad Apollon. Rkod. ii. 297.) [L. S.]

AENESIDEMUS (AfVrjdiS^os), the son of Patai'cus, and one of the body-guards of Hippo­crates, tyrant of Gela, was the son of Theron, the ruler of Agrigentum, in the time of the Persian war. (Herod, vii. 154, 165.) [theron.]

AENESIDEMUS (Alv^i^os), a celebrated sceptic, born at Cnossus, in Crete, according to Diogenes Laertius (ix. 116), but at Aegae, accord­ing to Photius (Cod. 212), probably lived a little later than Cicero. He was a pupil of Heracleides and received from him the chair of philosophy, which had been handed down for above three hun­dred years from Pyrrhon, the founder of the sect. For a full account of the sceptical system see pyrrhon, As Aenesidemus differed on many points from the ordinary sceptic, it will be conve­nient before proceeding to his particular opinions, to give a short account of the system itself.

The sceptic began and ended in universal doubt. He was equally removed from the aca­demic who denied, as from the dogmatic philoso­pher who affirmed; indeed, he attempted to con­found both in one, and refute them by the same arguments. (Sext. Emp. i. 1.) Truth, he said, was not to be desired for its own sake, but for the sake of a certain repose of mind (drapa£ia) which followed on it, an end which the sceptic best at­tained in another way, by suspending his judg­ment (eTrox^f), and allowing himself literally to rest in doubt, (i. 4.) With this view he must travel over the whole range of moral, metaphysi­cal, and physical science. His method is the comparison of opposites, and his sole aim to prove that nothing can be proved, or what he termed,

AENESIDEMUS. 33

the icroa-Oeveia of things. In common life he may act upon <t>aiv6fji.eva with the rest of men: nature, law, and custom are allowed to have their influ­ence ; only when impelled to any vehement effort we are to remember that, here too, there is much to be said on both sides, and are not to lose our peace of mind by grasping at a shadow.

The famous Sewa rpoiroi of the sceptics were a number of heads of argument intended to over­throw truth in whatever form it might appear. [pyrrhon.] The opposite appearances of the moral and natural world (Sext. Emp. i. 14), the fallibility of intellect and sense, and the illusions produced upon them by intervals of time and space and by every change of position, were the first arguments by which they assailed the reality of things. We cannot explain what man is, we can­not explain what the senses are: still less do we know the way in which they are acted upon by the mind (ii 4—7): beginning with ouSei/ dpi£aj, we must end with oi)§ei> (j.$\\ov. We are not certain whether material objects, are anything but ideas in the mind: at any rate the different qua­lities which we perceive in them may be wholly dependent on the percipient being; or, supposing them to contain qitality as well as substance, it may be one quality varying with the perceptive power of the different senses, (ii. 14.) Having thus confounded the world without and the world within, it was a natural transition for the sceptic to confound physical and metaphysical arguments. The reasonings of natural philosophy were over­thrown by metaphysical subtleties, and metaphy­sics made to look absurd by illustrations only ap­plicable to material things. The acknowledged imperfection of language was also pressed into the service; words, they said, were ever varying in their signification, so that the ideas of which they were the signs must be alike variable. The lead­ing idea of the whole system was, that all truth involved either a vicious circle or a petitio prin-cipii, for, even in the simplest truths, something must be assumed to make the reasoning applicable. The truth of the senses was known to us from the intellect, but the intellect operated through the senses, so that our knowledge of the nature of either depends upon the other. There was, how­ever, a deeper side to this philosophy. Every­thing we know, confessedly, runs up into some­thing we do not know: of the true nature of cause and effect we are ignorant, and hence to the favourite method, dird rod els aireipov e/cj8aAAe*v, or arguing backward from cause to cause, the very imperfection of human faculties prevents our giving an answer. We must know what we believe ; and how can we be sure of secondary causes, if the first cause be wholly beyond us? To judge, however, from the sketch of Sextus Empiricus (Pyrrh. Hyp.), it was not this side of their system which the sceptics chiefly urged: for the most part, it must be confessed, that they contented themselves with dialectic subtleties, which were at once too absurd for refutation, and impossible to refute.

The causes of scepticism are more fully given under the article pyrrhon. One of the most re­markable of its features was its connexion with the later philosophy of the Ionian school. From the fail­ure of their attempts to explain the phenomena of the visible world, the Ionian philosophers were in­sensibly led on to deny the order and harmony of

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